As part of the program Regional Initiative to Combat Disinformation “Western Balkans Anti-Disinformation Hub: Exposing Malign Influences through Watchdog Journalism”, we present you a new monthly analyses of fake news and disinformation narratives.
From Moscow to America – Serbia in a complex geopolitical game
For years, Serbia has found itself at a geopolitical crossroads, balancing between the influences of the West, Russia, and China. This foreign policy approach is often described as “delicate balancing,” while the course Belgrade has taken is referred to as “multi-vector.” This strategy was chosen primarily due to the expected economic benefits of Serbia’s position as a regional hub for economic activity, but also because of the complex internal and foreign policy challenges the country faces.
On one hand, the West—particularly the European Union and the United States—remains a key partner for economic development, investment, and political stability. The path toward EU membership and integration with Western markets and institutions is still one of Serbia’s strategic goals. On the other hand, Russia and China are traditional allies and important geopolitical players who support Serbia in international forums and offer alternative sources of investment and political backing, especially on matters related to national sovereignty and regional relations.
The absence of a formal foreign policy strategy leaves room for ad hoc decisions, personal political judgments, and short-term diplomatic calculations, rather than a consistent, long-term, and transparent foreign policy. While it is understandable why Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to its complex and decentralized political structure, still lacks such a document, Serbia—aspiring to play a regional leadership role and seeking EU membership—can hardly justify the absence of a strategic foreign policy framework at a time when international relations are increasingly dynamic and global security architecture is growing ever more unstable.
In this context, clear foreign policy orientation is not just a matter of formality but also one of political maturity and institutional responsibility. Without a strategic document, the balancing act between East and West can easily devolve into political indecision, inconsistency, or vulnerability to external pressure. These foreign policy complexities and ambiguities are most clearly reflected in recent visits by President Vučić to Moscow and Washington, as well as in Patriarch Porfirije’s official visit to Russia. These visits underscore Serbia’s attempt to maintain relationships with key global powers, while also highlighting how difficult that process has become in the absence of a clear, official, and transparent strategy that could provide a foundation for long-term stability and predictability in international affairs.
Vučić’s Tourist Visit to Florida
At the end of April, the President of Serbia addressed the public via Instagram, announcing in a video message that he had arrived in the United States, accompanied by the caption: “We will fight for justice. All together. We will never give up. Serbia will prevail!” He expressed hope for important and productive meetings with top Republican and U.S. officials.
The very next day, it was announced that President Vučić would meet with Rudy Giuliani, a well-known Republican politician and former mayor of New York. Vučić shared news of the meeting on social media, stating that he had an excellent conversation with his “old friend” Giuliani. “Rudy was the first to support the Belgrade Waterfront project, and today we discussed establishing closer relations between Serbia and America,” Vučić wrote.
It was also announced that the Spring Gala Dinner of the Republican National Committee would be held at Donald Trump’s luxurious Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida, also known as the “Summer White House.” However, this visit was not listed on the official presidential website, which is the standard procedure for official trips. This raised questions about why the Serbian president was in Florida and whether he was there in an official capacity or for private reasons.
Journalist Boško Jakšić, in a statement to Nova.rs, commented that Vučić would not miss the chance to present himself to the domestic public as a leader with global ambitions. “A bit of Americans, a bit of Russians — Europeans don’t interest him, especially since criticism of his handling of protests in Serbia and his planned trip to Moscow for Victory Day has intensified,” said Jakšić. This statement highlights Vučić’s diplomatic strategy and the complexity of Serbia’s foreign policy. Simply put, the president appears to maintain good relations with various international actors — whenever it suits him.
Very little was known or reported about Vučić’s visit until it was over. What is clear is that the president never entered Trump’s estate and did not meet with him. On May 3, media outlets reported that Vučić would not attend the main events that brought him to the U.S. He decided to cut his trip short and return to Serbia for health reasons.
What many found odd was that, despite allegedly feeling unwell, Vučić did not visit a hospital but instead immediately flew back to Serbia, enduring a long transatlantic flight. There has been much speculation about the reasons for his sudden departure. While no one can say with certainty what happened, one thing is clear — this episode represents a diplomatic failure. The message from the U.S. may be exactly what Vučić fears most: that he is becoming irrelevant.
The First Personal Meeting Between Putin and Vučić Since the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
In an era where information travels faster than it can be critically processed, symbols often become weapons. Such is the case with May 9th—a date that, in the collective consciousness, can signify either Victory Day over fascism or Europe Day. While most EU countries mark this day as a symbol of peace, integration, and shared values, in our region it is increasingly used as an occasion to promote anti-European narratives.
This May, it wasn’t the essence of the holiday that captured public attention, but rather the political choreography: the presence of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić at the Victory Day parade in Moscow, and the media euphoria that accompanied the visit. Pro-government outlets such as B92 and Alo were quick to claim that the West had turned Victory Day into a “day of prohibition” and “day of censorship,” accompanied by their usual message that Nazism had not been defeated but merely returned to the political scene disguised as “European values.”
President Vučić attended the military parade on Moscow’s Red Square, held in honor of the victory in World War II—an event widely condemned in the West due to Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine. Besides Vučić, the only two European leaders present were Željka Cvijanović, Chairwoman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico.
The European Union had issued warnings to all leaders of candidate countries, threatening sanctions if they participated in the celebration hosted by Vladimir Putin. Despite this, Vučić met with Putin, and according to reports from Moscow, they discussed the Serbian oil industry—soon to be targeted by U.S. sanctions due to its Russian ownership—as well as political matters. “We exchanged views on current global geopolitical developments, the situation in the Western Balkans, and the challenges we face in maintaining peace and stability,” Vučić said.
Vučić’s visit to Moscow on May 9th was more than a routine diplomatic gesture—it was a powerful symbolic signal that, in today’s geopolitical reality, was inevitably interpreted as political alignment. At a time when most European leaders are distancing themselves from Moscow due to the war in Ukraine, Vučić’s presence at the parade—despite clear warnings from Brussels—sent a message that Serbia is not only out of step with EU foreign policy but is willing to openly defy the core values the EU promotes.
The symbolism of May 9th further amplifies that impression. While the EU celebrates Europe Day as a tribute to peace, unity, and overcoming the divides of war, Serbia—through its president—chose to associate that date with narratives that strengthen Russian influence and undermine the country’s European trajectory. In doing so, Vučić, whether intentionally or not, placed Russia ahead of the EU—both in foreign policy positioning and in the message delivered to the domestic and international public.
The Controversial Visit of Patriarch Porfirije to Moscow
Shortly before President Vučić’s trip to Moscow, Serbian Orthodox Church Patriarch Porfirije also visited Russia, where he met with Patriarch Kirill and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Although the visit was officially of a religious nature, its political significance sparked intense public reactions in Serbia. Particularly controversial was a portion of the meeting in which Porfirije addressed the ongoing social protests in Serbia, describing them as part of a “color revolution”—thus fully adopting the government’s narrative used to delegitimize civil dissent.
The patriarch’s remarks, delivered in front of the Russian leader, also included the claim that the Serbian people “sometimes place more trust in Russian politics than their own,” and that, in the event of future geopolitical realignments, the Serbian people should position themselves within the “Russian environment of the Orthodox world.” While framed as spiritual reflections, these statements clearly align with the geopolitical aspirations of nationalist factions in Serbia that oppose European integration.
What is especially concerning is that the patriarch—spiritual head of one of the most trusted institutions in Serbia—chose to publicly address domestic political matters before the leader of a foreign state. In doing so, at least symbolically, the Serbian Orthodox Church became involved in the process of redefining the country’s international orientation—on a path directly at odds with Serbia’s declared goal of joining the European Union.
Pro-government media outlets portrayed the visit as a gesture of unity and spiritual closeness, while opposition figures and media rightfully criticized this overt political involvement of the Church. Porfirije’s comments about “foreign centers of power that do not want the development of Serbian identity” fit neatly into the familiar pattern of foreign policy propaganda—targeting the West while glorifying cooperation with Moscow. This event further exposed how increasingly blurred the lines between religious, state, and foreign policy interests have become in Serbia—and how much they are now leaning toward the East.
Author: Nataša Stanojević
