As part of the program Regional Initiative to Combat Disinformation “Western Balkans Anti-Disinformation Hub: Exposing Malign Influences through Watchdog Journalism”, we present you a new monthly analyses of fake news and disinformation narratives.
Russian signal to Belgrade: What really lies behind the SVR Report on the “Serbian Maidan”
In Serbia, student and civic protests have continued for almost eleven months, marking the largest public mobilization in recent decades. The unrest began after the collapse of the canopy at the newly reconstructed railway station in Novi Sad, when citizens demanded criminal and political accountability for infrastructure failures. Over time, the protests gained broader support, including from students, academics, and civic groups advocating for transparency and government accountability. Despite this, pro-government and pro-Russian media have repeatedly reframed the motives of demonstrators, presenting the protests as part of a wider plot orchestrated by foreign powers—thus discrediting the genuine social and political grievances driving the movement.
In mid-September 2025, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) issued a statement claiming that the European Union was behind the months-long protests in Serbia, asserting that the anniversary of the Novi Sad station collapse on November 1 would be used to launch a “Serbian Maidan,” or “color revolution.” The same report listed several media outlets allegedly financed by the EU to “brainwash Serbian youth.” On the surface, this appeared to reinforce the government’s narrative of foreign interference and destabilization efforts against Serbia.
However, the very nature of the SVR’s statement is unusual, as politically sensitive messages of this kind are typically communicated by state officials rather than intelligence agencies. Still, such methods of indirect communication are not without precedent in Russian political practice. Moscow has long used “intermediaries” to send signals to its allies—a tactic reminiscent of Soviet-era diplomatic signalizing toward junior partners. Similar examples can be found in recent history, such as Dmitry Rogozin’s 2016 visit to Belgrade or Maria Zakharova’s public comments following the signing of the Washington Agreement in 2020, both of which served to test and discipline Serbia’s political loyalty.
Coverage of the SVR Report in pro-government media
Pro-government tabloids, particularly Informer, relayed the SVR’s claims without any critical reflection, emphasizing the notion of a “color revolution” being prepared in Serbia. These reports suggested that the West was using money and media influence to mobilize protest voters and bring people to the streets, portraying student and civic demands as manipulations by foreign actors. Historical traumas—such as NATO’s 1999 bombing—and the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church were also invoked to evoke emotional responses and strengthen patriotic sentiment among domestic audiences.
President Aleksandar Vučić publicly thanked the SVR for its “information,” using the term “Serbian Maidan” and stressing that Serbia had been “prepared for such scenarios for a long time.” Such statements reinforce the idea that protests are not spontaneous expressions of civic discontent but rather the product of external interference. “I have no doubt that those who organized the color revolution will not simply give up—too much money has been invested, so they will need a final attempt,” Vučić declared, without specifying who these alleged organizers were.
A similar pattern of information manipulation was observed in Georgia in 2023, shortly before parliamentary elections. At that time, the SVR released a statement claiming that the United States was planning a “revolution in Georgia”—a so-called “Maidan in Tbilisi”. The accusations closely resembled those made against the EU in Serbia but were aimed at Washington instead. Both cases illustrate how Russia routinely deploys public intelligence statements about “color revolutions” to discredit Western governments, imply foreign interference, and position itself as a defender of “sovereign interests” across the post-Soviet and Balkan regions.
The SVR’s statements leave little room for ambiguity and are relayed domestically as unquestionable truth. They specifically name media outlets and portals accused of “brainwashing youth,” which prompted strong reactions from those organizations and from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS). NUNS warned that such insinuations endanger journalists and stigmatize their work. The European Union firmly denied the allegations, describing them as disinformation aimed at spreading anti-Western rhetoric. A spokesperson for the European Commission told the BBC that such narratives were “rapidly proliferating in Serbian media” and significantly shaping public perceptions of both the EU and democracy in Serbia.
The Narrative of the “Serbian Maidan”
The “Serbian Maidan” narrative is carefully constructed through a web of interconnected messages that together paint the protests as products of foreign influence rather than genuine civic discontent. This framing diminishes the importance of citizens’ actual grievances and shifts the focus to the notion of an “invisible hand of the West.” It relies heavily on historical and emotional symbols—particularly the collective memory of NATO’s bombing and the central role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in preserving national identity—to portray the protests as an attack on Serbia’s sovereignty and tradition. Meanwhile, independent media and civil society organizations are depicted as instruments of foreign interests, weakening their credibility and social role.
This environment fosters division and distrust, allowing the government to demonstrate to both the West and Moscow that it retains full control over internal affairs—while ensuring that Serbia remains firmly anchored within Russia’s informational orbit. Analysts suggest that the SVR’s approach also serves as a form of indirect pressure on Belgrade, implying that Serbian authorities are unable to manage domestic unrest without Russian assistance.
Opposition parties, such as the Freedom and Justice Party (SSP), have noted that this is not the first time the SVR has “uncovered” a supposed Serbian Maidan ahead of major protests. A similar incident occurred roughly a year and a half earlier during demonstrations over alleged election fraud, when President Vučić once again expressed gratitude to Russian intelligence. According to the opposition, such narratives serve to legitimize the regime and obscure the real power structures shaping Serbia’s domestic and foreign policy decisions.
The “color revolution” discourse also draws heavily on historical comparisons—most notably with Ukraine’s 2014 Maidan—to depict Serbian protesters as instruments of Western interests. These comparisons ignore local contexts and the actual causes of discontent, including issues of infrastructure, corruption, and transparency.
Overall, the SVR’s statement, its amplification in Serbian media, and the government’s response demonstrate a coordinated effort to reinterpret reality through the lens of foreign interference and patriotic rhetoric. This approach delegitimizes civic activism and independent journalism while reinforcing narratives about external threats and the necessity of strong, centralized authority. Similar patterns observed in Georgia and Ukraine indicate that such disinformation tactics are part of a broader, long-term Russian strategy—one designed to preserve influence and legitimize authoritarian governance both at home and among its regional partners.
Author: Nataša Stanojević
