The Western Balkans is rich in linguistic and dialectical diversity, religions, and folklore, but culturally, the people of the Balkans share common, strongly expressed traits. This analysis explores the link between these shared characteristics and the region’s vulnerability to anti-Western disinformation campaigns, which deepen societal polarization. This polarization, which widens the gap between any two groups in the Balkans, leads to the creation of parallel realities without a bridge for dialogue. Within these parallel realities radicalization that fosters conflict is making all six countries vulnerable to instability.

In its 2021 study mapping disinformation and fake news in the Western Balkans, the European Parliament identified four key factors—i.e., weaknesses—that will continue to allow disinformation to harm the region unless addressed. According to this study, the four defined vulnerabilities are:

1. Governance—particularly the failure to fulfill election promises after parties come to power and the low functionality of a system entangled in corruption and disinterest in improving citizens’ lives;
2. Geopolitics and the positioning of Western Balkan countries in relation to the international community—especially in countries whose very existence is contested;
3. Enmity—i.e., the perpetual state of opposition and antagonism toward “the other,” regardless of whether that other differs by ethnicity or religion;
4. Disunity—manifested through citizens’ loss of trust in institutions and societal actors, or in the European Union itself, due to the manner in which enlargement and integration of the Western Balkans are conducted.
   

The analysis explores how these four (or perhaps one or more) vulnerabilities are exploited by anti-democratic actors to deploy anti-Western disinformation campaigns that provoke polarization within their societies.

While governance and geopolitics in the Western Balkans are widely researched, measured, monitored, and analyzed—making them more easily described as common factors in disinformation campaigns—enmity and disunity delve deeper into citizens’ intimate attitudes. The democratic backsliding in this particular analysis falls under governance, regardless whether it is analysed as a cause or effect. 

Disunity being exploited through ethnic, religious, and ideological affiliations as primary lines used for division, including by domestic political actors. On the other hand enmity—an active state of opposition, exploited for its cause of deeply rooted social and institutional distrust.

While it is fairly obvious how disunity strengthens polarization, the connection with enmity is less visible. However, enmity is perhaps the most natural state for Balkan peoples, due to historical legacy and traditions, and thus serves as the strongest basis for disinformation campaign breakthroughs and polarization.

This constitutes a kind of democratic paradox. While it is healthy for democracy to include diverse and opposing opinions—which nourish debate and prevent uniformity—when such opposing opinions are irreconcilable, they lead to intractable divisions that can be exploited for polarization, which in turn leads to conflict and a potential for instability.

Albania

From the perspective of governance and geopolitics, Albania holds a strong Euro-Atlantic position, being a NATO member with 100% military and political integration, and a country with open negotiations for European Union membership. 77% of the population supports EU membership and considers it a good thing, indicating that Albania has firmly established strategic commitments internally that are fully aligned with the will of the majority of its citizens. As a result, the country is less susceptible to polarization through anti-Western disinformation campaigns. However, with social trust and trust in institutions, the percentages decrease, approaching half of the population. This implies that the absence of institutional trust creates space for citizen polarization through disinformation campaigns.

Unlike other Western Balkan countries, Albania is in a specific position regarding internal cohesion. Initial indications of this can be seen in the results of the most recent 2023 census. The dominant spoken language is Albanian, spoken by over 90% of the population, and it is also the most commonly consumed language in media. This does not mean that other languages, such as Serbian, present in regional media, have no influence in Albania, but such influence is significantly limited due to the natural language barrier. Ethnically, over 90% of Albania’s population identify as Albanians. On the other hand, although the most recent census shows that the country has a Muslim majority and Christians are the second-largest religious group, the data on ethno-cultural characteristics reveal another detail: 66.9% of the population affirmed these predetermined religious affiliations, whether Muslim, Christian, or other religions. Of the rest, 13.8% identified as believers but not affiliated with any of the listed religions, 3.6% identified as atheists, and 10.2% preferred not to answer the question about religion.

These data show why polarization in Albania based on ethnic or religious division is more difficult compared to other Balkan countries. However, in terms of contradictions, present-day Albania, like other Balkan states, inherits a historical legacy of authoritarian rule, which has deeply rooted public distrust in institutions due to the use of oppression and control in governance.

This also clarifies why disinformation campaigns in Albania are more often domestic in nature, carried out by internal actors who exploit governance issues or contradictions as a basis for polarization, rather than a combination of foreign and domestic actors exploiting geopolitics and internal divisions. In this context, two motivations are evident among domestic actors in Albania. The first is material—clickbait, sensationalism, and quick profit. More importantly, research by Faktoje has shown that the two main opposition parties in Albania—the Democratic Party (DP) and the recently rebranded Freedom Party (FP)—are among the primary vectors spreading disinformation to gain political influence in the country.

The combination of dissatisfaction with governance and lack of transparency by authorities, historically rooted institutional distrust, and the disinformation propagated by opposition political parties—which always intensifies during election periods—creates a space for deepening polarization among citizens, manifested through the delegitimization of institutions.

Delegitimization of institutions is also observed through anti-Western narratives, often framed in a way suggesting that the current political leadership threatens the country’s international standing through alleged Russian influence, even though such claims largely serve rhetorical purposes.

A clear example of citizen polarization in Albania through the undermining of trust was the disinformation around the supposed reception of 100,000 Palestinians from Gaza. Although this piece of disinformation—originally published by an Israeli journalist—was officially denied by Albania’s current Prime Minister Edi Rama, only a few hours later came a statement by the U.S. President Donald Trump, in which he said he would not rule out the possibility that Albania could host Palestinians from Gaza. This statement triggered a wave of disinformation and speculation, which was subsequently exploited to undermine public trust in institutions, invoking past experiences such as the reception of Iranian Ashraf refugees in 2016 or Afghan refugees in 2021.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina is the antithesis of Albania when comparing Western Balkan countries. Polarization in Bosnia and Herzegovina is evident even through the first lens—that of governance and geopolitics—due to its complex political and governing structure established by the Dayton Peace Agreement, which on one hand ended the war, but on the other, preserved the divisions among the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has a Euro-Atlantic strategic orientation, established relations with NATO, and a decision to begin accession negotiations with the EU. According to surveys, although there is a declining trend in support, a significant majority of 77.4% of citizens would vote for EU membership. This support varies only in Republika Srpska, where the majority in favor of joining the EU is 54%. The figures for NATO are similar in terms of proportions, where a slightly lower difference in support is seen exclusively in Republika Srpska. In Republika Srpska, where there is evident influence from close cooperation with Serbian authorities and Serbian media, there is also room for polarization through disinformation campaigns, which maintain these levels of lower support for Euro-Atlantic integration by reinforcing anti-Western sentiment.

According to the last census in BiH, conducted in 2013 (the first one after the war), about 50.11% identified as Bosniaks, 30.78% as Serbs, and 15.43% as Croats. In terms of religion, 51% identified as Muslims, 31% as Eastern Orthodox Christians, and 15% as Roman Catholics. This post-war setting makes ethnic and religious divisions among citizens very pronounced and vulnerable to polarization. The percentages are similar when it comes to language use: Bosnian – 52.86%, Serbian – 30.76%, and Croatian – 14.6%. However, it is important to note that due to the mutual similarity of these languages, Serbian media have a significant impact on the entire population. Slightly more recent data can be found in the 2023 European Commission Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, but these do not affect the above proportions.

This “trilateral” division of Bosnia and Herzegovina in administrative, religious, and political terms on one hand, and the linguistic penetration of Serbian media on the other hand, creates the foundation for intense polarization. Historical grievances of nationally unresolved or partially contested post-war verdicts of war crimes lay in these foundations. These divisions are politically exploited, especially in Republika Srpska, where political elites and aligned media are bolstered by Serbian and pro-Russian discourse, often framing Euro-Atlantic engagement as existential threats to Serb identity.

Endemic corruption in governance created weakened democratic institutions, in combination with ethno-national agendas unable to counter neither domestic actors undermining Dayton structures nor foreign influence. Democratic backsliding and shrinked space for human rights and freedoms, particularly but not exclusively in Republika Srpska, creates fertile ground for anti-Western and nationalist propaganda. These narratives erode confidence in democratic processes by portraying reform efforts as foreign meddling rather than necessary progress, often contributing to local grievances with imported geopolitical narratives to delegitimize EU/NATO, reduce trust in state institutions, and inflame polarization along identity lines.

Kosovo

Kosovo is a very specific case in the Western Balkans where internal vulnerabilities are systematically weaponized by foreign and domestic anti-democratic actors to destabilize institutions and polarize society. The polarization lens in Kosovo is primarily shaped through the dual pressures of geopolitical positioning and identity-based narratives, particularly around the North, unresolved relationship with Serbia, and Kosovo. 

Kosovo maintains a clear Euro-Atlantic orientation. It has strong cooperation with NATO (especially through KFOR) and continues to deepen its relations with the EU. However, this geo-political stance has made Kosovo`s periods of increased institutional assertiveness in the north or during political processes such as elections, vulnerable to internal polarization based on erosion of trust in democratic institutions. 

Kosovo’s vulnerability to polarization is further magnified by its ethnic composition—predominantly Albanian (over 90%), with a significant Serbian minority concentrated in the north—and by the language and media environment. Serbian-language media from Serbia continues to have a strong presence in the northern municipalities and among Kosovo Serbs, creating a parallel information ecosystem. The linguistic proximity and media penetration allow anti-democratic actors to bypass Kosovo’s official communication channels and sow discord from within. According to the last census in 2024, the same proportions follow the religious affiliation with over 95% of Muslim community. The most specific data regarding Kosovo is that it has the youngest population in Europe with over half of the population being under 30 years. 

Although the disproportions in religious and ethnic communities are visible, close political ties of the Serbian orthodox community with Serbian government or the Serbian Orthodox Church and by proxy the Russian Orthodox Church, are a strong influence over the (in)stability of Kosovo. 

Kosovo`s information ecosystem recognises disinformation campaigns which intensify around elections, security incidents, as well as the government’s lack of accountability due to corruption or institutions serving political interest rather than citizen`s one. These campaigns sought to explore lack of good governance and portray Kosovo as an unstable entity covering corruption through systematic repression of its Serbian population, often equating state enforcement of sovereignty with ethnic aggression. Narratives of “ethnic cleansing,” reminiscent of 1990s rhetoric, resurface and get widely disseminated by pro-Serbian media outlets.

Although significant for public discourse polarization, the disinformation campaigns eroding trust and encouraging delegitimization of institutions are not the only weaponry in the antidemocratic arsenal. Kosovo has often been the target of intensified cyberattacks that serve the same purpose, such as the state-owned railway company or Prime-minister Albin Kurti being pranked by Russian prankers, which demonstrated the effectiveness of information manipulation tactics designed to embarrass leaders and undermine public trust.These campaigns deliberately blurred the lines between real institutional challenges and fabricated crises, aiming to reduce public confidence in Kosovo’s democratic development and Western integration.

Montenegro

Montenegro occupies a particularly fragile position in the Western Balkans due to the intersection of geopolitical polarization, identity disputes, and institutional vulnerability. Although Montenegro has traditionally been regarded as one of the most advanced EU accession candidates in the Western Balkans, its Euro-Atlantic orientation remains heavily contested within domestic political discourse. This creates fertile ground for anti-Western disinformation campaigns that exploit ideological, religious, and identity-based divisions to deepen polarization and weaken democratic resilience.

According to the 2023 census, Montenegro is ethnically diverse, with Montenegrins making up around 41% of the population, Serbs around 32%, Bosniaks approximately 9%, Albanians nearly 5%, and other communities comprising the remainder. Religious affiliation closely overlaps with ethnic identity, with the majority belonging either to the Serbian Orthodox Church or the Montenegrin Orthodox community, alongside Muslim and Catholic minorities. Linguistically, Montenegrin and Serbian dominate public communication and media consumption, while the strong penetration of Serbian media ecosystems significantly shapes the country’s information environment.

This overlapping of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and political identities has turned Montenegro into one of the region’s most polarized societies in ideological terms. Political divisions increasingly revolve around competing narratives concerning statehood, national identity, relations with Serbia, the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the country’s geopolitical orientation between the West and closer ties with Serbia and Russia.

Disinformation campaigns in Montenegro frequently exploit these identity cleavages. Anti-Western narratives portray NATO membership as a betrayal of traditional and Orthodox values, while EU integration is often framed as foreign interference aimed at undermining sovereignty, religion, or national identity. These narratives intensified particularly after the country joined NATO, during disputes surrounding the Law on Freedom of Religion, and throughout periods of government instability and coalition fragmentation.

Foreign and domestic anti-democratic actors use the weak institutional trust present in Montenegrin society to reinforce polarization. Political instability, frequent changes of government, corruption scandals, and perceptions of politicized institutions have contributed to declining public confidence in democratic governance. Such vulnerabilities are systematically amplified through coordinated disinformation campaigns, sensationalist media reporting, and social media echo chambers closely connected to regional nationalist and pro-Russian networks.

Montenegro’s media landscape remains deeply fragmented and politically influenced. Serbian tabloids and regional media with strong anti-Western editorial lines have substantial reach among Montenegrin audiences, enabling cross-border dissemination of polarizing narratives. In this ecosystem, political disputes are often framed in existential terms — as struggles for survival of the nation, religion, or identity — which contributes to radicalization and delegitimization of political opponents.

The country is therefore vulnerable not only because of external influence, but because unresolved internal identity disputes create ideal conditions for manipulation. The combination of weak institutional trust, identity polarization, strong external media penetration, and geopolitical contestation allows anti-democratic actors to continuously undermine democratic cohesion and societal stability in Montenegro.

North Macedonia

Polarization in North Macedonia is twofold—rooted both in long standing ethnic/religion divides and in an increasingly visible ideological trench between pro-Western democratic aspirations and anti-democratic anti-Western narratives.

Ethnic fragmentation remains a dominant structuring force in politics and society. The 2021 census confirmed that ethnic Macedonians comprise 54.21% of the population, while Albanians make up 29.52%, followed by Turks, Roma, Serbs, Bosniaks, and others. However, the census process itself reignited deep mistrust: a significant number (est. around 7%) of Macedonian citizens boycotted the process or were recorded administratively, due to pro-Russian parties campaigning the boycott. The politicization of the census reflects the enduring instrumentalization of ethnic identity, as collective rights and institutional representation hinge on the 20% legal threshold defined by the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The census follows the same line on religion, with 46.14% declaring themselves as Orthodox, 32.17% as Muslims followed by the rest. Linguistically, the numbers add up to the ethical and religious lines, with over 60% claiming Macedonian as their native language, around 25% Albanian and the rest follows Serb, Bosniak, Turkish, Roma, Vlach and other communities. Worth noting that Macedonian language speakers are susceptible to Serbian language media due to its similarities from the slavic languages family, therefore the Macedonian community is being affected by Serbian media ecosystems as well. 

Beyond ethnicity, ideological polarization is intensifying. While mainstream parties formally support EU integration, public support is uneven and eroding, especially among youth and marginalized groups. Disinformation actors and illiberal political forces are capitalizing on frustrations related to the country’s stalled EU accession process, French political veto of accession, concessions to Bulgaria, and perceived Western impositions. Anti-Western narratives are increasingly mainstreamed through pro-Russian actors which questions democratic institutions and portrays Euro-Atlantic integration as neocolonial pressure. These narratives often overlap with ethnic grievances, framing reforms as betrayals of national or group identity.

Systemic corruption in governance, democratic backsliding as well as geopolitical blindspots certainly helped in creation of massive overflux with disinformation campaigns exploiting the disappointment of citizens towards the West, which nurtures anti-democratic sentiments. Anti-democratic actors are using polarizing disinformation to target elections and bring North Macedonia back into the sphere of Serbia and Russia, u-turning its Euro-Atlantic path.  

The convergence of ethnic and ideological polarizations creates a fertile ground for foreign information manipulation and internal democratic backsliding. Social trust remains low, media ecosystems fragmented, and the political elite deeply divided—creating conditions for continued exploitation by anti-democratic actors.

Serbia

Serbia falls under a very different category for the Western Balkans, paradoxically: a country which is formally engaged in European integration, yet increasingly oriented—rhetorically and emotionally—toward narratives that undermine the very values and alliances it claims to pursue.  The strategic vulnerability of Serbia to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) lies less in isolated weaknesses and more in a deeply rooted systemic fragility. Despite formal adherence to democratic principles, the country continues to operate within a framework where institutional independence is persistently undermined by executive influence or political pressure. Compounding this is the lack of a sustained democratic tradition, as Serbia has historically been governed by autocratic leaders creating an environment predisposed to centralization of power, personalization of politics, and public susceptibility to leader-centric narratives.

These long-term structural issues are exploited and sustained by the Serbian government itself, which—through a network of loyal media outlets—acts as a primary amplifier of disinformation and anti-democratic rhetoric. Systematic media monitoring has shown a staggering volume of manipulations and falsehoods on the front pages of pro-government media outlets. These manipulations are not arbitrary; they are carefully orchestrated to advance narratives that polarize society, delegitimize opposition voices, and sustain the ruling elite’s hold on power. 

According to the official 2022 census, above 80% of the population is Serbian, followed by 2,8% Hungarian, 2,3% Bosniak, 2% Roma and 0.9% Albanian, and others. The same logic and numbers follow the spoken languages. In terms of religion 81,1% of the population is Orthodox while 4,2% is Muslim and the rest fall under other Christian denominations, except 3,7% of atheists.

Serbia`s narratives are almost exclusively dedicated to sustaining the ruling elite into power portraying it in either “martyr” or “hero” position, however the opposing “threat” varies and depends on the given political opportunity. The range goes from most common which are the anti-western narratives, portraying west as an evil force with the only goal to bring down Serbia. Ethno-nationalist and anti-minority narratives are the second largest group of disinformation narratives, however, due to historical grievances particularly from the wars in the 90ties, these are the most flammable ones, with the ability to act as catalysts with spillover effects. Narratives of the inevitable West fall and new global order is often combined with anti-lgbt narratives, often portrayed one as the cause of other. Lastly are the conspiracy theories and scientific disinformation which find ample space in mainstream outlets. 

These narratives jointly and undoubtedly undermine public trust in institutions, science, and international cooperation, contributing to Serbia’s vulnerability in times of crisis. More importantly, these narratives are not merely domestic in intent. They resonate regionally creating a cross-border echo chamber of ethnonationalism and anti-Western sentiment. The Serbian government and aligned media actors often present themselves as protectors of Serbs outside Serbia, providing fertile ground for interference under the guise of ethno-national solidarity. Its institutional fragility, historical predisposition toward strongman rule, and a media environment dominated by loyalty rather than professionalism combine to make it one of the most fertile grounds for foreign and domestic information manipulation in the Western Balkans.

Conclusions

Foreign information manipulation and disinformation campaigns in the Western Balkans are systematically employed to deepen existing societal divisions and obstruct democratic consolidation. They instrumentalize unresolved historical grievances, ethnic tensions, and socio-political vulnerabilities polarizing public opinion along ideological and identity-based lines. Analysed by country, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia, disinformation actors exploit ethnic diversity to entrench interethnic distrust, while in Serbia narratives are shaped around traditionalism, anti-West/anti-democracy or pro-authoritarian sentiments. Kosovo and Albania on the other hand, have a disinformation environment more focused on undermining trust in institutions and challenging the Euro-Atlantic orientation or justification. Throughout all Western Balkans, anti-democratic actors use hybrid tactics to amplify local distrust, delegitimize pro-democracy actors, and normalize foreign authoritarian influence.

Recommendations 

To push back against the compounding influences of disinformation into the Western Balkans, international allies such as the EU, NATO, OSCE must apply performance-based conditionality, linking accession and funding to measurable measures of institutional integrity and a plural media. At a national level, governments must have an institutionalized whole-of-society approach that brings together all democratic actors. Anti-corruption strategy must be  combined with national security, through open public exposure of media manipulation, elite networks, and external intervention connections. Civil society and independent media professionals should be enabled through decentralizing fact-checking and investigative strength, including cross-border editorial collaborations. Disinformation must be taken into account as a vulnerability and as a driver of radicalization in conflict or post-conflict environments, to ensure increase of resilience and preventing violent extremism. Finally, regional cooperation systems need to be constructed in order to support institutional learning alongside tracking evolving narrative patterns, with attention not only on the content of disinformation but also on the affective and identity-based narratives through which polarizing rhetoric is becoming legitimized and internalized.