Recent weeks’ incidents, ranging from physical attacks to political manipulation, have heightened tensions in Kosovo-Serbia relations. The grenade attack on the Kosovo Post Office in Zvecan and the arrest of several Serbian “pilgrims” in Gjakova and Prizren, some of whom were identified as members of Serbia’s security services, have reignited concerns over Serbia’s interference.
The Government of Kosovo warned that Belgrade is employing various methods, including blackmail, threats, and criminal attacks, to disrupt the democratic functioning of the state.
These developments follow Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s accusations that Serbia interfered in the February 9, 2025 parliamentary elections, as well as it showed efforts to sabotage the formation of new institutions of the ninth legislature, through the Serb List and Milan Radoicic, the orchestrator of the terrorist attack in Zvecan.
At the initiative of the acting Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, the Kosovo Security Council held an emergency meeting on April 6, 2025. According to a press release, the discussion focused on “the overall security situation, with an emphasis on Serbia’s destabilizing plans and criminal interference.”
One of the incidents highlighted was the grenade attack on the Kosovo Post Office in Zvecan on April 1, 2025. Reports indicate that two hand grenades were thrown, one of which exploded. The attack was seen as part of a broader strategy to create panic and sow distrust in Kosovo’s institutions in the north.
The Detainment and Release of the “Pilgrims”
Another development that prompted reactions was the stopping of 16 individuals, divided into four vehicles with license plates from Kragujevac, Serbia, on April 5 and 6, who claimed to be pilgrims. What initially appeared to be a religious activity took a different turn when authorities stated that they had identified four of the individuals as officers of Serbia’s security services. According to them, four of the detained individuals are active officers in Serbia’s security services. Based on preliminary information, it was suspected that these groups aimed to gather intelligence on potential targets, as evidence was found linking them to Serbia’s military intelligence structures as well as members of the Banjska terrorist group. The first group, consisting of four people, was stopped in Gjakova. During a vehicle search, photographs of Kosovo’s map, images of terrorists killed during the Banjska attack, two knives, an axe, and a rotating light were found. The Basic Court in Gjakova imposed a 30-day detention order.
However, of the 12 Serbs who were detained on April 6 in Prizren, initially, ten of them were released through regular procedures, and two were held for 48 hours. But on April 8, the Basic Prosecutor’s Office released the last two suspects.
This led government officials to criticize the judiciary, calling it concerning that “the ease with which these individuals were released undermines police operations and other security institutions that apprehended these two groups with evidence and facts.”
On the other hand, Serbian media and politicians responded with a wave of accusations against Kosovo, claiming that this was yet another episode aimed at terrorizing Serbs. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic stated that certain measures had been taken, without specifying what those measures were.
The Office for Kosovo in the Serbian government declared that the latest wave of arrests of pilgrims from Serbia is a continuation of the destabilization of the situation in Kosovo and the pressure on the Serbian population.
Narratives from Serbia following such tensions are part of a consolidated strategy that, over the years, has proclaimed that Serbs in Kosovo are victims of “institutional terror,” an approach aimed at convincing not only the domestic public but also the international community.
Accusations of Interference in the Formation of the Government
The recent events unfolded within a broader context of mutual accusations of political interference, which intensified following Kosovo’s latest parliamentary elections.
The Government of Kosovo has recently accused Serbia of obstructing the establishment of Kosovo’s institutions after the February 9, 2025 elections, as well as of coercing Serbs to participate in pro-Vucic protests. According to officials, Serbia is allegedly using threats, incentives, and blackmail to stir interethnic and inter-party tensions in Kosovo.
These accusations come at a time when the winning party of the acting Prime Minister, Kurti, has yet to secure a coalition partner for the formation of the new government.
“Through the Serb List and the chief terrorist Milan Radoicic, acting as its ‘de facto’ leader, Serbia is now interfering with some non-majority and non-Serb community MPs in an attempt to sabotage the establishment of new institutions of the ninth legislature. With threats, enticements, and particularly with blackmail, it is trying to provoke interethnic and inter-party tensions in Kosovo and destabilize the country. This represents a blatant interference with our state sovereignty, democratic functioning, and institutional integrity,” read the government statement following the Security Council meeting.
It further stated that “all institutions and state mechanisms are required to remain vigilant and prepared.”
For years, Serbia has used parallel structures and its security networks in Kosovo to exert influence, while simultaneously attempting to portray itself as the protector of “endangered” Serbs. Kosovo, on the other hand, seeks to emphasize its institutions as guarantors of law and security for all citizens, including the Serb community, and to expose Serbia’s interference as politically motivated and orchestrated.
Deadlocked Dialogue
The latest developments, including the arrests, the attack in Zvecan, and accusations of interference in Kosovo’s institutions, are unfolding at a time when dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia remains stalled. The EU-mediated process, intended to normalize relations between the two countries, is currently at a standstill, with the lack of progress creating space for increasingly polarized narratives. These divisions were evident to the new EU Special Envoy, Peter Sorensen, during his first official visit to Prishtina and Belgrade in March. During her most recent visit to Albania, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy acknowledged that mistakes had been made in the process and noted that new modalities are being explored to move toward normalization.
Kosovo accuses Serbia of failing to implement any part of the Ohrid Agreement reached in March 2023, especially regarding de facto recognition of Kosovo’s statehood and the cessation of Serbia’s campaign against Kosovo’s membership in international organizations. On the other hand, Serbia claims that Kosovo is refusing to establish the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities—an issue Belgrade has turned into a tool of international pressure, presenting it as a “precondition for normalization.”
*This article is published as part of the Western Balkans Regional Initiative against disinformation. “Western Balkans Anti-Disinformation Hub: exposing malign influences through watchdog journalism.”