On October 30, 2024 the European Commission’s (EC) Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations issued the annual progress reports for the six Western Balkans countries which are candidates for EU membership. This article provides an overview of the report findings related to the issues of countering the malign effects of disinformation as threat to information integrity.
Since 2024 tackling disinformation esp. in the context of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) is formal requirement by candidate countries. Within the reports, these issues are mainly covered in the sections on Freedom of expression with the Chapter 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) and within Chapter 31 (Foreign, security and defence policy). The findings per country are documented in alphabetical order.
Albania
The introduction of EC Albania Report 2024 notes that the country “is between having some level of preparation and a moderate level of preparation in the area of freedom of expression and made no progress during the reporting period.”
EC warns that “media independence and pluralism continued to be affected by the high market concentration, the overlap of business and political interests, the lack of transparency of financing sources, the high concentration of media ownership, intimidation and precarious working conditions for journalists” while “the Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid” (Pg. 8).
The report also informs that “In April 2024, the Parliament established an ad hoc parliamentary committee on tackling disinformation and foreign interference, without the support of the opposition. It remains important that this committee ensures a comprehensive approach, and that resulting legislation is fully aligned with EU acquis and European standards, including as regards freedom of expression.” (Pg. 38)
Another point of concern is “limited job security and poor working conditions for journalists pose serious challenges in terms of self-censorship, pressure from politicians and reduced resistance to disinformation. Journalists working in local media, young journalists and female journalists are more vulnerable to these challenges… Journalists face serious hardships in terms of limited financial and human resources and the limited possibility to set up effective cooperation with the government to promote the interests of independent media. Self-regulation is negatively affected by limited resources and a polarised media landscape and needs to be further strengthened.” (Pg. 39)
Within the Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy, the report notes:
“Regarding hybrid threats, Albania has adopted a new National Security Strategy in 2024, with a stronger focus on advancing and developing its capacities for defence against hybrid threats (see under Chapter 10 – Digital transformation and media). In June 2024, Albania signed a Memorandum of understanding to become member of the European Centre of Excellence for Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) in Helsinki. Further efforts remain needed to close the space for foreign interference and information manipulation, including disinformation, and to build societal resilience against this and other forms of hybrid threats. Albania aligned with EU Declarations and restrictive measures in reaction to cyber-attacks in 2023 and 2024.” (Pg. 94)
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina Report 2024 warns that the country has “a hostile environment for media freedom” due to “political pressure, intimidation and threats against journalists,” including constant verbal attacks and nationalist rhetoric.
The report stresses that the “Republika Srpska entity’s public channel RTRS spreads Russian disinformation, including on Russia’s aggression on Ukraine and on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU path. Banja Luka-based provider M-tel continued to carry the signal of the RT channel, despite the country aligning with EU sanctions prohibiting the broadcasting of these Russian state-sponsored media. (See also Chapter 10 – Digital transformation and media).” (Pg. 39)
Another point of concern is that “Internet Online platforms are used to spread hate speech and disinformation, as self-regulation of online media has a limited effect. Criminal prosecution is limited to the incitement of religious and ethnic hatred online.” (Pg. 39)
Within the Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy, the report notes:
“Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have an overall assessment or a policy framework for addressing hybrid threats and remains vulnerable to serious cyber-attacks that targeted its public institutions in 2023 and 2024. Banja Luka-based provider M-tel continued to carry the signal of the RT channel, despite Bosnia and Herzegovina’s alignment with relevant EU sanctions on Russia. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to make further efforts on closing space for foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including disinformation, taking actions towards building societal resilience against all forms of hybrid threats.” (Pg. 89)
Kosovo
In the Kosovo Report 2024 the European Commission notes:
“Kosovo needs to stay alert to new threats and developments and revise the existing programmes and strategic documents accordingly. Authorities took a leading role in the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees from foreign conflicts. There were no further repatriations of individuals from the region due to logistical challenges. The authorities need to focus on education, training and preparedness of local practitioners dealing with returnees. After piloting the local multidisciplinary mechanism in 2023, it was further expanded to cover four more municipalities. The authorities should improve their capacity to address terrorist content online and to develop effective counter-narratives and strategic communication to counter disinformation.” (Pg. 43)
Montenegro
In its introduction on media freedom the Montenegro Report 2024 notes that the country “has a pluralistic media environment and is between having some level of preparation and moderate level of preparation in the area of freedom of expression. Overall, good progress was achieved in the reporting period, notably with the adoption a media legislative package – new Media Law, new Law on Audiovisual Media Services and new Law on Public Broadcaster RTCG – in line with the EU acquis, and European standards, which was a key recommendation of last year’s report.” (Pg. 7)
These new laws adopted by the Parliament in June 2024 transformed the Regulatory Agency for Electronic Media (AEM) which became the Agency for Audiovisual Media Services (AMU). AMU “was accorded the authority to effectively monitor and impose fines in case of violations of the law. The AMU has taken steps to strengthen its operational capacity in order to use its newly acquired powers to effectively monitor the functioning of the audiovisual market and promote media literacy.” (Pg. 71)
Within the Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy, the report specifically mentions the need for further work on FIMI:
“Montenegro has a good level of preparation. Good progress was made as the country maintained its track record of full alignment with relevant statements by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decisions on sanctions, including with the EU restrictive measures related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has provided assistance to Ukraine. Montenegro continued to participate in EU crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy. The recommendations from last year were implemented. In the coming year, Montenegro should, in particular:
→ maintain its full alignment with the EU common foreign and security and strengthen its enforcement capacity regarding restrictive measures.
→ take further efforts to close space for foreign interference and information manipulation, including disinformation, and take action towards building resilience against all forms of hybrid threats by adopting the strategy on countering hybrid threats and its related action plan.” (Pg. 20)
In particular, under the section “Fight against terrorism” regarding “Implementation and enforcement capacity” the report notes the risk of disinformation:
“During 2023, no individual was convicted of a terrorism offence. A cause for concern is the growing right-wing extremist content online, hate speech and disinformation, exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the war in Gaza.” (Pg. 47).
North Macedonia
The North Macedonia Report 2024 notes that regarding freedom of expression “Internet Net neutrality is guaranteed, both in terms of legal provisions and practical implementation. However, challenges remain in the online media sector, with growing threats arising from disinformation, hate speech and breaches of intellectual rights. The Council of Media Ethics observed a fourfold rise in complaints about hate speech compared to the previous year.” (Pg. 36)
Within the Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy the report specifically notes two positive developments:
“On hybrid threats, North Macedonia joined the Helsinki-based European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in October 2023 and has been implementing its 2021-2025 strategy for building resilience and dealing with hybrid threats. The country promotes cooperation on exchanging data and national experiences with the partner intelligence services. Since March 2024, a Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, and a working group were established for coordination of the activities related to NATO membership, including enhancing resilience against hybrid threats. North Macedonia aligned with EU Declarations and restrictive measures in reaction to cyber-attacks in 2023 and 2024.
North Macedonia has embarked on establishing a strategic institutional and regulatory framework to counteract the adverse effects of disinformation. Recommendations for Joint Action for Building Societal Resilience Towards Malign Influences of Disinformation, prepared by civil society with international support, were adopted by government as a basis for creating a national strategic framework, and included in its 2024 work programme. Further efforts are needed to close the space for foreign interference and information manipulation, including disinformation, and to build societal resilience against this and other forms of hybrid threats.” (Pg. 90)
The second development refers to the initiative developed by 11 civil society organizations and academic institutions which was formally submitted by the Metamorphosis Foundation as Proposal and Annex in September 2023 through the mechanism for cooperation between the government and civil society. It received positive Response by the Ministry of Defence and also positive Response from the Cabinet of the Deputy President of the Government in charge of Good Governance Policies.
Serbia
Within the Serbia Report 2024, the European Commission notes on page 3 that:
“Following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Serbia aligned with some EU positions in international forums (including in the UN General Assembly). Serbia has continued to cooperate with the EU on sanctions circumvention and providing financial and humanitarian support to Ukraine. However, it still does not to align with any restrictive measures against the Russian Federation and has not aligned with most of the High Representative statements on this matter. It has maintained high-level relations with the Russian Federation and intensified its relations with China, raising questions about Serbia’s strategic direction. Under the EU-Serbia negotiating framework, Serbia is expected to progressively align its policies towards third countries with the policies and positions adopted by the EU, including restrictive measure.
The Serbian government has continued to declare EU membership its strategic goal. However, the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of Government and Parliament has slowed down the progress of reforms. Strong political will, effective policy planning and coordination, along with sufficient human and financial resources for EU accession across all institutions involved are needed, so that Serbia can speed up the work towards meeting its objectives for EU accession negotiations. The Serbian authorities still need, as a matter of priority, to take much more responsibility for proactive and objective communication on Serbia’s EU accession process and the EU, which is by far Serbia’s main political and economic partner, and for countering disinformation in its national media.”
EC warns that “cases of threats, intimidation, hate speech and violence against journalists, including female journalists, persist, including at local level. Recurrent statements by high-level officials on the daily and investigative work of journalists have a chilling effect on freedom of expression.” (Pg. 38).
Under Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy, the EC notes:
“Serbia is moderately prepared in the area of common foreign, security and defence policy. No progress was made overall during the reporting period as Serbia’s alignment pattern was largely unchanged, and some of its actions and statements went against EU foreign policy positions. Serbia maintained high-level relations with the Russian Federation, raising questions about Serbia’s strategic direction. The country also intensified relations with China. This included the entry into force on 1 July 2024 of the Free Trade Agreement with China, which is a strategic concern. Serbia continued cooperating with the EU on sanctions circumvention and continued providing support to Ukraine. Serbia continued to participate in and contribute substantially to EU crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy. The recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the coming year, Serbia should in particular:
→ improve, as a matter of priority, its alignment with EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including restrictive measures, and avoid actions and statements that go against EU foreign policy positions;
→ continue to step up action to prevent any attempt to use the territory of Serbia or legal bodies registered in Serbia to circumvent EU restrictive measures;
→ make credible efforts to close space for foreign interference and information manipulation, including disinformation, and take action to build societal resilience against it and other forms of hybrid threats.” (Pg. 20)
EC further warns that “On hybrid threats, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including disinformation remain matters of concern to be urgently addressed. Serbia did not align with EU Declarations and restrictive measures in reaction to cyber-attacks in 2023 and 2024.” (Pg. 97)
